Inflation and relative price variability in China: theory and evidence. by Yuan, Jiang. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Inflation and Relative Price Variability in 
China: Theory and Evidence 
YUAN, Jiang 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
Ill 
Economics 














框架 。 理洽研究表明，代表轉型經濟特徵的 “制度成本刊較大程度上影日向了中國
的相對價格昇動， 由此解釋了方什么中國有著比西方發達經濟體更大的相河份




This thesis investigates the relationship between inflation and relative price 
variability (RPV) in the Chinese economy and attempts to explain why China 
has much more relative price variability than other large economies , such as 
U.S., EU and India. After reviewing three alternative models related to 
inflation and RPV, we construct a dataset with market-determined prices and 
government-control ones to test whether these models held or not in the 
Chinese economy. We provide empirical evidence that inflation and relative 
price variability are significantly correlated for the two different types of 
prices in the overall sample periods. We find that menu cost models play a 
central role in pricing behavior of the Chinese firms and the effect of menu 
cost on RPV is larger for government-control prices than for market-
determined ones. Additionally we show that the relationship between 
inflation and RPV is significant both in high and moderate inflationary 
episodes but vague and unclear during the period of deflation. Based on the 
empirical findings , the phenomenon of over relative price variability is 
investigated by incorporating "institutional cost" which is special in the 
Chinese economy and the relationship between RPV and institutional cost is 
discussed. Our study implies that relative price variability in China is highly 
determined by the amount of institutional cost. Empirical evidence shows that 
about 12.5 percents of RPV is determined by institutional cost in China. 
Overall, our theoretical and empirical findings have important implications for 
the choices of macroeconomic policies in China. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Since the economic reform started in late 1970s, China has experienced 
pronounced economic growth at an average rate of 9. 78% over the past thirty 
years (1978-2007). Besides the high growth, the Chinese economy has always 
exhibited a remarkable cyclical pattern: periods of rapid growth, accompanied 
by accelerating inflation, are followed by sharp contractions during which the 
growth rate and inflation decline in tandem. For instance, in the latest past 10 
years, the deceleration of economic growth in the period 1997-2003 led to a 
decline of inflation, while the recent acceleration of growth since 2003 has 
resulted in increasing inflation with the peak of 5.9% in 2008. Such a "boom-
boost" feature has been widely documented and the institutional 
characteristics, such as soft-budget constrain and state-owned sectors in 
transitional China, are always considered as the fundamental reasons (Brandt 
and Zhu, 2000; Gong and Lin , 2008; Narayan et al , 2009). 
Beyond the cyclical pattern of inflation-output nexus, there exists another 
attractive phenomenon - the relative price variability (RPV) , measured by 
the variance of inflation rate across sectors in the whole economy 
underlying inflation in the Chinese economy over the past 30 years. In the 
episodes of increasing inflation, the variability of relative price will always rise 
in the meantime; on the contrary , while the aggregate price level decreases , 
the deceleration of relative price dispersion will follow afterwards (see Figure 
1.1). However , little attention has been paid to such an inflation-RPV nexus 
in the Chinese economy. In the mainstream economics , relative prices play a 
central role in guiding efficient distribution of commodities and optimal 
allocation of resources. The variability of relative price, as a short-term price 
distortion, will disable the incentive function of price signals for people to 
change their behavior, result in misallocation of resource and then inefficient 
production. 
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Data source: CEIC, Jan 1994-Dec 2008. Inf1ation rate is measured by consumer price 
index ( CPI, year on year), and relative price variability is the variance of inf1ation 
rates across 8 categories of goods and services. 
As clearly stated by Woodford (2003, pp. 12- 13), 
". .. instability of the general level of prices [may create] discrepancies between 
relative prices owing to the absence of perfect synchronization in the adjustment 
of the prices of different goods. These relative price distortions lead in turn to 
an inefficient sectoral allocation of resources, even when the aggregate level of 
output is correct." 
Over the importance of relative pnce dispersion and significant association 
between inflation and RPV, one central question arises: what is the underlying 
linkage between inflation and relative price variability in the transitional 
Chinese economy? This thesis attempts to investigate the relationship 
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between inflation and relative price variability in six chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review over the relationship between 
inflation and RPV. The theoretical literature mainly consists of three types of 
models: menu cost models, signal extraction models and monetary search 
models. Interestingly, the implications of these models concerning the role of 
expected inflation and unexpected inflation are very different. In typical 
empirical analyses, econometric methods of ARMA or GARCH are always 
employed to disaggregate the aggregate inflation into three parts, expected 
inflation, unexpected inflation and inflation uncertainty. The relationships 
between RPV and different types of inflation are always investigated in most 
empirical literature. Detailed estimating methods and evidence are reviewed 
panoramically in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 mainly focuses on the empirical relationship between inflation and 
relative price variability in China. It is the first time to use the Chinese data 
to conduct empirical analysis on above competing theoretical hypotheses. 
Different from most research just based on developed and market-driven 
economies , we construct a dataset including two types of prices: one is retail 
price index (RPI) which is largely market-determined, and the other IS 
producer price index (PPI) that is strongly influenced by the control of 
government. Two main findings include: (1) expected inflation and unexpected 
inflation both have effects over relative price variability for market-
determined price RPI, which is similar to the findings in US and EU, etc. 
However, (2) for PPI, which is strongly influenced by the control of 
government , it is just expected inflation that has impact on RPV. Above 
evidence shows that menu cost (namely, fix cost) has prevailing influence over 
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the pricing behaviors of Chinese firms, especially for the state-owned 
enterprises subject to price guidance from the government. 
Chapter 4 further investigates the inflation-RPV nexus In different 
inflationary regimes. Over the past two decades, the Chinese economy has 
continuously experienced three different inflationary regimes, from high 
inflation (1991-1996), to deflation (1997-2003) and then recent moderate 
inflation (2003-2008). The relationships between inflation and relative price 
variability are characterized diversified in various regimes: ( 1) the inflation-
RPV nexus is obvious in high and moderate inflation but vanishes in deflation 
episode; (2) there are significant influences of expected inflation on RPV for 
both government-control price and market-determined price in high and 
moderate inflationary regimes, which implies that fix cost plays central role in 
firm's pricing behavior; (3) the empirical effect of inflation on relative price 
variability is vague and unclear in the period of disinflation, which requires 
further theoretical research on the economics of deflation. 
Chapter 5 attempts to explain why there is much more relative pnce 
variability in China than in other large economies. Beyond the fix cost 
investigated in previous chapters, we argue that there is institutional cost In 
the Chinese economy and the existence of institutional cost have influence 
over relative price variability. Institutional cost is the financial expenditure of 
SOEs on lobbying the government for price-resetting agreement. Our study 
shows that the relative price variability of China is highly determined by the 
amount of institutional cost. Empirical evidence implies that institutional cost 
could explain about 12.5 percent of relative price variability in China. 
Chapter 6 is conclusion and policy implications. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter will briefly review the literature on the relationship between 
inflation and relative price variability (RPV). The first part of this chapter 
emphasizes on the theoretical literature, which mainly consists of three types 
of models: menu cost models , signal extraction models and monetary search 
models. Interestingly, the implications of these models concerning the role of 
expected inflation and unexpected inflation are very different. The empirical 
literature on the relationship between inflation and RPV, including var1ous 
estimating methods and evidences , 1s reviewed 1n the second part of this 
chapter. 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
2.1.1 Menu Cost Model 
In economics , menu costs are the costs to firms of updating menus , price lists, 
brochures , and other materials when price change in an economy. Because this 
transaction cost exists , firms sometimes do not change their prices when the 
economy puts pressure on it , leading to price stickiness. Hence, this type of 
models predict a positive relationship between RPV and expected 
inflation(Sheshinski and Weiss 1977; Rotemberg 1983; Benabou 1992; Fielding 
and Mizon 2008). 
In these models , firms set pnces discontinuously by an (S , s) pnc1ng 
scheme. Because of inflation, the firm 's real price starts at S and then falls to 
s over time. At that time , the firm increases its nominal price to keep its real 
price once again equal S. On the other side with deflation trend , a firm 
decreases its nominal price accordingly. Since the width of the (S , s) band 
5 
highly depends on the size of its menu costs, for a g1ven aggregate demand 
shock, firm-specific menu costs lead to staggered price setting, distorted 
relative price, and an increase of relative price variability. More crucially, 
these models predict that, as inflation (exactly expected inflation) increase, 
the optimal width of the (S, s) band will be larger and more variability in 
relative price will be created. Therefore, menu cost models typically imply 
that RPV is increasing in the absolute value of expected inflation. 
However, as noted by Danziger(1987) , the period between observations on 
prices must be shorter than the one over which any given firm maintains a 
fixed nominal price for this prediction to hold. For instance, if there two 
period were equal in length, the RPV would always be zero despite (S, s) and 
would be unrelated to expected inflation. 
2 .1. 2 Signal Extraction Model 
Signal extraction models share the assumption that inflation is not always 
anticipated correctly. As a consequence, firms and households confuse absolute 
and relative price changes and take mistaking actions between price change 
and quantity change. There are two kinds of signal extraction models: one is 
these pioneering models of Lucas (1972 , 1973) and Barro (1976), the other is 
an extended model by Hercowiz (1981) and Cukierman (1983). 
For Lucas-Barro signal extraction model , it predicts that RPV should 
increase with inflation uncertainty. The higher inflation uncertainty , the more 
various local shocks will be interpreted as aggregate shocks and will be 
responded to with price changes rather than quantity adjustment. On the 
other side , anticipated aggregate demand (or anticipated inflation) has no 
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influence over RPV because all firms respond identically to any g1ven 
aggregate shock. 
For Hercowitz-Cukierman signal extraction model, it further considers the 
impact of unanticipated inflation over RPV by assuming that price elasticities 
of supply differ across firms. Given an unexpected aggregate demand, firms 
with high elasticities of supply will adjust prices less than do firms in market 
with low elasticities of supply. Moreover, the magnitude of the dispersion in 
price adjustment across sectors increases with the magnitude of the aggregate 
demand shock. This leads to the prediction that RPV will be associated with 
the magnitude of unexpected inflation, whether positive or negative. 
2.1.3 Monetary Search Model 
Monetary search models emphasize that buyers have only incomplete 
information about the prices offered by different sellers. Typically, in these 
models, there exist two channels through which inflation and price dispersion 
could interact (Peterson and Shi 2004; Head and K umar 2005): one is seller's 
market power and the other is buyer 's search intensity. 
On the one side, higher expected inflation lowers the value of fiat money 
which increases overall market power that differs across sellers and, thus, 
relative price variability. On the other hand , higher expected inflation also 
raises the gains of search, which lowers seller's market power and, thereby, the 
price dispersion. As inflation rises, the RPV increasing effect will eventually 
dominate. Yet , there will be a region within which small changes in expected 
inflation have little effect on relative price variability. Head and Kumar (2005) 
showed that expected inflation may increase RPV only if it exceeds a critical 
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value. Hence, the overall effect inflation on RPV is not always obvious and it 
highly depends on various inflation regimes. 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
Following the pioneering work by Mills (1927) and then Vining and 
Elwertowski (1977), the early empirical evidence on the relationship between 
inflation and relative price variability is typically based on linear regressions 
of RPV on inflation. In line with menu cost and signal extraction models, 
further studies mainly concern the role of expected inflation, unexpected 
inflation and inflation uncertainty in the pricing behavior of firms. Hence, 
econometric methods of ARMA, ARCH or GARCH are usually employed to 
disaggregate inflation rate into these three parts. Most empirical contributions 
find a significant positive coefficient of expected inflation, unexpected inflation, 
or inflation uncertainty, see e.g. Parsley (1996), Grier and Perry (1996), 
Debelle and Lamont (1997) , Aarstol (1999), and Jaramillo (1999). However, 
there are exceptions. For example, Reinsforf (1994) found a negative 
relationship for 65 categories of goods in nine U .S. cities, Fielding and Mizen 
( 2000), Silver and Ioannidis ( 2001) show that RPV decreases in inflation for 
several European countries. 
Along with the implications of monetary search models, recent evidence 
shows that the relation between inflation and RPV might be much more 
complex. First, the impact of inflation on RPV is different for high and low 
inflation periods and countries with different inflationary contexts, see e.g. 
Dabus(2000), Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) and Caraballo, Dabus and 
Usabiaga (2006). Second, the functional relationship between inflation and 
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RPV might be more sophisticated than linear form. Using non-parametric 
methods, Fielding and Mizen (2008) find that the U.S. inflation-RPV linkage 
is non-linear. Nautz and Scharff (2006) apply panel threshold models to price 
data of Euro area countries. In line with Head and K umar (2005), they find 
evidence in favor of threshold effects in the European link between expected 
inflation and RPV. Finally , some studies imply that expected inflation 
increases RPV only if it exceeds a certain threshold. For instance, Caglayan, 
Filiztekin and Rauh (2008) show that the relationship between RPV and 
expected inflation confirms the predictions of monetary search models from 
the observing price data from bazaars , convenience stores, and supermarkets 
in Turkey. 
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Chapter 3 Inflation and Relative Price Variability 
in a Transitional Economy: Evidence from China 
3.1 Data and Variables 
Currently most research on relative pnce variability is mainly based on 
developed economies, such as US, Europe and Israel etc, underlying which 
there is an implicit assumption that prices are determined by market power. 
Over the past 30 years, China has been gradually transforming from a central 
planned economy to a market driven economy. By the year of 2001, market 
price has determined 97.4% and 97.3% of retail sales and agricultural products 
respectively (World Bank, 2005). 
Consistent with the research in most market driven economies, we employ 
Retail Price Index and its 17 subcomponent pnces as our key measures of 
inflation and relative pnce variability. The RPI sample is from 1994:10 to 
2008:12. At the 3-digi t disaggregated level the corresponding RPV measure 
RPVRF'/-I? is based on the prices of the complete set of 17 subcategories and 
calculated as the variance of sectorial price fluctuation in the whole economy 
(see Table 3.1). In order to check the robustness of our results , we 
additionally consider RPVRPI- core as an alternative RPV measures , where food 
and energy prices are excluded to control for supply shocks. More precisely , 
we eliminated the price of "food", "fuels" and "agricultural goods" from the 
17 RPI subcomponents. 
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Table 3.1 RPV Measures 
( 1) Market-determined price 
Variable Measure Dataset 
RPVRP/ - 17 RPI 3-digit 
RP VRPI - core RPI 3-digit 
(2) Government control price 
Variable Measure Dataset 
RPVPP/ - 38 
I 3R 2 
- " (rr - rr) 38 L...l= l 11 I PPI 3-digit 
RPV PP! - core 
)I" l 
- Tr - Tr 33 ,) " .) PPI 3-digit 
(3) Alternative measures 
Variable Measure Dataset 
1 8 2 
-" (Tr - Tr) gL...i= l i l I CPI 2-digit 
1 (, 2 
-" (Tr - Tr) 6L...i=l il I RP V CPI - core CPI 2-digit 
RPVPP/ - 7 
I 1 2 
- " (Tr - Tr ) 7 L...i =J il I PPI 2-digit 
Notes: Tr
1 
denotes the aggregate infla tion rate while Tr;1 represents the sectorial price of subcomponent i. 
All of our price data arc from CEIC database which is provided by t he China Nationa l Bureau of 
Statistics . Some subcatcgorics of our three price data set arc adjusted in J anuary 2001. 
However , the Chinese government still controls about 10% prices of industrial 
products (World Bank, 2005) . The percentage of government determined 
prices is much larger if government guided prices of industrial products are 
included. In December 1997, the Chinese government is empowered to control 
and guide prices of most industrial and raw materials products which play 
central a role in the national economy according to the Law of Price1 • Two 
1 According to the Law of Price (1997), the governments arc empowered to cont rol in fi ve areas: (1 ) 
products related to nat ional economic development and people's daily life (2) scarce resource products (3) 
natural monopoly goods (4) important good price of public ut ili ty and (5) im portant pu blic service 
prices . 
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institutions in National Development and Reform Commission, department of 
price and department of price supervision, are set up and mainly responsible 
for the price control and guidance in the Chinese economy. For instance, in 
order to control inflation rate in 2007, the price control authority delayed to 
approve the application of oil price increase for three months. More than 50% 
subcomponents of Producer Price Index are associated with price control, so 
PPI is a better representative measure to investigate the price behavior with 
transitional characteristics, compared with market driven price RPI. 
Due to data constrain, the PPI sample is from 1996:10 to 2008:12 and at 3-
digit disaggregate level. The corresponding RPV measures are RPVI'I'/ -)k with 38 
subcategories. Similarly, we also calculate the RPVPPJ -core in order to control 
supply shock, by eliminating the prices of "Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Extraction", "Agricultural & Sideline Food Processing", "Food 
Manufacturing", "Coking & Nuclear Fuel & Petroleum Processing", and "Gas 
Production & Supply", i.e. 5 out of the 38 PPI subcomponents. 
Beyond above 3-digit level PPI and RPI with 38 and 17 subcomponents 
respectively , two lower digit level price Consumer Price Index ( CPI) and PPI 
both with 7 subcomponents are then employed as a compliment to above two 
3-digit level price datasets. The corresponding RPV measure of CPI is 
RPVcPJ- core that eliminated "food" out from the 8 CPI subcategories. 
3.2 Inflation Decomposition 
The theories on the relation between inflation and relative pr1ce variability 
distinguish among expected, unexpected inflation and inflation uncertainty. In 
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line with the empirical literature, we generate the measures for three inflation 
components using a decomposing equation by a simple time-series model: 
where r/J1 ( L) and r/J2 ( L) are polynomials in the lag operator. ;r, is the inflation 
rate at time t while v, denotes the residuals. However, preliminary 
investigation indicates that above models of the China monthly inflations are 
inadequate because the prediction errors of the best-fitting ARMA are 
heteroscedatic. So inflation is further modeled as a GARCH (1, 1) process to 
allow the conditional variance of inflation V1
2 to evolve with prediction errors 
u~, , regarding inflation: 
2 2 2 
(5v ,t = ao + al vt - 1 + a2(5v t- 1 (2) 
Similar with Silver and loannidis (2001), expected inflation (El) is derived as 
the one-period-ahead inflation forecast while unexpected inflation (Ul) is the 
resulting forecasting error (Ul= Jr -El). The Garch equation provides us with 
time series for inflation uncertainty (CV AR). Using Maximum-Likelihood 
estimation, we applied a standard information criterion (AlC) to determine 
the optimal lag structure. Detailed results of the estimated inflation 
decomposition equations are shown in Table 3.2. 
Finally, in order to test the prediction of the Hercowitz-Cukierman model that 
the sign of the inflation shocks should be irrelevant , two auxiliary series are 
created from unexpected inflation (UI) , compared to Aarstol (1999). One is 
positive unexpected inflation (UIP) , which is equal to UI if UI ~ 0 and UIP = 0 
otherwise; the other is negative unexpected inflation UIN , which means 
UIN=UI is UI:::; 0 and UIN = 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.2 The Inflation Decomposition Equation 
Retail Price Index (01/1994-12/2008) 
RP! 1 28 RP! 0 31 RP! 0 Trl = · Trl - - . 1r + .23 r - 0.60 r + r 
(366 .66) 1 (- 95 .63) l - 2 (9.48) l - 5 (- 152 .28) l- 12 I 
rr
2 
= 0.56+ 0.04 r 2 - 1.05 rr 2 
r,l (7.7 1) ( 1.82) l - 1 (- 18.41) r,l - 1 
adjusted R2 = 0.99 Q(12) = 21.40 [0.01] ARCH(12)= 10.82 [0.54] 
Producer Price Index (10/1996-12/2008) 
Tr1PPI = 1.34Tr,P_!(' - 0.36Tr1~~1 + 0.31 V1_ 1 - 0.34 V1_ 12 + V1 (13 .76) (- 3.56) (4 .64) (- 7.92) 
rr
2 
= 0.25+ 0.51 v2 - 0.26 rr 2 
v,t (4.96) (3.45) t - 1 (- 3.44) v,t-1 
adjusted R2 =0.97 Q(12)= 11.24 [0.19] ARCH(12)= 6.23 [0.90) 
Consumer Price Index (01/1994-12/2008) 
CPI 1 27 CPI 0 25 CP! 0 04 CPI 0 9 Trt = · Tr, _1 - · Trt- 2 - · Trl - 12 - .5 u, - 12 +ut (13.84) (- 2.63) (- 4.28) (- 10.8 5) 
rr 2 = 0.27 + 0.31 u 2 -0.34 o- 2 
u,t (4.53) (1.74) t - 1 (- 1.64) u,t - 1 
adjusted R 2 = 0.99 Q(12) = 6.47 [0.59) ARCH(12) = 7.20 [0.84] 
Note: Above results are estimated by Evicws 6.0. For each equation , the optimal structure is determined 
by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Alternative specification strategies lead to very similar estimates 
of expected inflation (El) , unexpected inflation (UI) and inflation uncertainty (CV AR). Q(12) denotes 
the Ljung-Box statistics testing for serial correlation in the residuals; ARCH(12) denotes the LM 
statistics testing for ARCH effects. p-value arc given in brackets , t-statistics in parentheses . 
3.3 Empirical Evidence 
3.3.1 Inflation and RPV 
As a preliminary excise, the positive relationship between inflation and RPV 
found by Parks (1978) and others is verified in our two data sets. The 
regression results of RPV over contemporaneous inflation squared are shown 
in Table 3.3 , in which the t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
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errors calculated by the procedure proposed by Newey and West (1987) to 
allow for residuals exhibiting both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of 
unknown forms. Note that explanatory variables are squared as needed here 
and throughout the paper so that the units of all variables at the right hand 
sides are the same and match that of RPV on the left hand sides. 
After above preliminaries, we turn to the general model of RPV which is given 
by the following equation (3): 
RPV, = Yo + y1Ef,2 + y2UIP/ + y3UIN,2 + y4CVAR, + v, (3) 
1n which RPV measured in four items ( RPVcp1_ 8 , RPVRPI-I 7 , RPVpp1_7 and 
RPVpp1_38 ) is regressed on expected inflation (El), positive unexpected inflation 
(UIP), negative unexpected inflation (UIN), and the conditional variance of 
inflation uncertainty (CV AR), all of which are generated by the inflation 
decomposition model in Section 3.2. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the results for inflation-RPV nexus with four RPV 
measures. All of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Some obvious 
results are drawn from Table 3.4. For RPI, the market based price measure, 
the estimates of the coefficients on expected inflation , positive unexpected 
inflation and negative unexpected inflation are significantly positive, positive 
and negative respectively at the 1% level, while the coefficient on the 
conditional variance of inflation is negative but insignificant. The positive 
relationship between expected inflation and relative price variability is 
consistent with the empirical findings in many other countries, such as US in 
Grier and Perry (1996), Aarstol (1999) and Fielding and Mizen (2008), 
Argentina in Dabus (2000), several European countries in Fielding and Mizen 
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Table 3.3 The Inflation-RPV Nexus for the Chinese Economy 
RPV, = a 0 + a 1 (1r, ) 2 + &, 
RPV,m-17 RPVPPI-38 RPVPPI -7 RPVCP/-8 
0.0026*** 0.0081 *** 0.011 *** 0.0022*** 
aJ (20.05) ( 4.76) (7.61) (25.55) 
R 2 0.69 0.14 0.29 0.79 
Notes: (1) Estimation results of above equations using four RPV measures from sample periods (for 
CPI and RPI from Jan 1994 to Nov 2008 , PPI from Oct 1996 to Dec 2008). (2) t-statistics are in 
parentheses. (3) *, **, *** indicate sign ificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level. 
Table 3.4 The General Model of RPV 
RPVRP/ -17 RPVPPI -3R RPVPP/-7 RPVCP/-8 
" 
0.0026*** 0.0082*** 0.0099*** 0.0034*** 
r~ (17 .34) ( 4.98) (6.88) (22.35) 
0.13*** -0.0034 -0.012 -0.072* 
r2 (3 .35) ( -0.059) (-0.25) (-1.90) 
" 
-0.38*** 0.34** 0.036 -0.127 
r~ ( -2 .69) (2.48) (0.31) (-0.74) 
-0.024 0.18 0.065 0.094 
r4 ( -0.089) (1.55) (0.66) (1.16) 
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.19 0.24 0.80 
Notes: ( 1) Estimation results of RPV equation using different inflation and RPV measures from 
sample periods (for CPI and RPI from Jan 1994 to Nov 2008, PPI from Oct 1996 to Dec 2008). (2) 
t-statistics arc in parentheses. (3) *, ** , ***indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significant level. 
(2000), and Mexico 1n Gagnon (forthcoming). Further, the two significant 
coefficients of unexpected inflation suggest that information misperception is 
pervasive in Chinese firms. For positive unexpected inflation shock, the 
positive coefficient 0.13 implies that firms would like to readjust price when 
inflation rate exceeds anticipation, which will result into increasing relative 
price variability. In contrast, the estimate of coefficient on negative 
unexpected inflation is negative, which shows that most firms are reluctant to 
set price lower when unanticipated negative inflation occurs. Above 
asymmetric findings here between the coefficient on positive and negative 
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unexpected inflation is consistent with that reported in Fisher (1982) and 
Aastol (1999) for US data, which rejects the theoretical prediction of 
symmetric price adjustment in Hercowitz-Cukierman model. Recently Gagnon 
(forthcoming) has found that price adjustment frequencies are highly 
unbalanced between low and high inflation episode after examining a large 
data set of Mexican consumer prices , which support our asymmetry pnce 
setting behavior for different shocks here. Finally, the absolute value of 
coefficient on two unexpected inflation are 0.13 and 0.38, which are larger 
than the one of expected inflation 0.0026. It means that firms' information 
misperception behaviors have dominated the effect of menu cost on setting 
price in competitive market. 
In contrast with market determined pnce RPI, PPI as the proxy of 
government control price shows some different but interesting evidence for the 
inflation-RPV nexus. First, the adjusted R2 for PPI equation is just 19%, 
comparing with 72% fitness for RPI equation in China as well as 72% in US 
PPI data ( Aastle , 1999). So there is still left 80% of price dispersion that 
could not be explained by current theories. Second , the estimate of coefficient 
on expected inflation is positive and significant at 1% level. The estimated 
value is 0.0082 which is three times larger than the one of RPI of 0.0026. It 
makes sense that firms under government control should have larger menu 
cost than firms in competitive market because most price setting decisions of 
those SOEs should be approved by price supervision authority. Finally, the 
estimate of the coefficient on negative unexpected inflation rate is positive and 
significant while the one on positive unexpected inflation rate is negative and 
insignificant. It is hard to explain such a paradox phenomenon and one 
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possible explanation IS that there exist some supply shocks influencing the 
estimated results. 
As a consequence, we can draw two general conclusions: (1) Menu cost 
model receive strong support from the data, however, the Lucas-Barro signal 
extraction model is rejected in the Chinese economy during the period from 
1994: 01 to 2008:12. (2) Hercowitz-Cukierman signal extraction model receives 
some support frorn the data but above estimated results oyer UIP and UIN is 
too diversified to arrive at a consensus on the role of Hercowitz-Cukierman 
models. In order to check our first conclusion and found more stable evidence 
of Hercowitz-Cukierman model from the Chinese data, we try to control 
supply shock and conduct a robust test in the following section. 
3.3.2 Robustness 
In this section, we use an alternative measure of RPV to examine the effects 
of supply-side shocks on the China inflation-RPV relation. A supply shock is 
an event that suddenly changes the price of a commodity or service. It may be 
caused by a sudden increase or decrease in the supply of a particular good. 
This sudden change affects the equilibrium price. Compared with the crucial 
importance of the oil-price shocks for the U.S economy in 1970s (Fisher, 1981) , 
supply shock plays no dominant role for the Chinese economy over the past 
two decades except the period between 1999 and 2001 , see Figure 3.1. 
Following Fisher (1981), we control for the effect of supply shocks by 
computing adjusted measures of RPV that excludes the categories related to 
foods, energy and agriculture goods. We have three alternative measures here, 
RPVRPI-core , RPVPPI - core and RPVCPJ - core , and the regression results of these 
RPVs against El, UIP, UIN and CVAR are shown in Table 6. 
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Figure 3.1 Supply Shocks and Relative Price Variability 
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Table 3.5 Supply Shock and The Inflation-RPV Relation in China 
RP VRPI -core RPV PPI -core RPV CP/-core 
0.0027*** 0.0094*** 0.0035*** 
r~ (17.62) (9.96) (23.62) 
0.13*** 0.051 -0.049 
r2 (3 .13) ( 1. 58) (-1.33) 
-0.40*** 0.11 -0.15 
r) (-2.79) ( 1.45) ( -0.90) 
" 
-0.058 -0.036 0.043 
r4 (-0.21) ( -0.56) (0.54) 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.41 0.82 
Notes: (1) Estimation resul ts of RPV equation using different inflation and RPV measures from 
sample periods (for CPI and RPI from J an 1994 to Nov 2008, PPI from Oct 1996 to Dec 2008). (2) 
t-stat istics arc in parentheses. (3) *, ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% , and 1% level. 
By controlling supply shocks , the relationship between inflation and RPV 
becomes much clearer. First , the relationships between RPV, expected 
inflation and inflation uncertainty are confirmed by the adjusted RPV. From 
Table 3.5, the estimates of coefficient on expected inflation (El) is 0.0027, 
0.0094 and 0.0035 for RPI, PPI and CPI respectively, which are all strongly 
significant at 1% levels. And the results in the fourth row further suggest that 
there is no significant relation between RPV and inflation uncertainty in the 
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Chinese data. 
Second, the estimated coefficients over unexpected inflation are both 
significant at level of 1% for RPI data, which is consistent with our previous 
evidence in Table 3.4. However, the lingkages between adjusted RPV and 
unexpected inflation do not receive sufficient support from PPI and CPI 
datasets by controlling supply shock. As a consequence, menu cost is the key 
factor to affect relative price dispersion for government control price PPI, 
which differs from "mixed" findings in the price data from market-based 
environment, such as RPI of China, PPI of US, etc. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Three existing models on the relationship between relative pnce variability 
and inflation are first empirically tested in a comparative group with two 
datasets, one is market-determined prices (retail price, RPI), and the other is 
government-controlled prices (producer price, PPI). The empirical evidence 
suggests that: (1) expected inflation and unexpected inflation both has 
significant effects over relative price variability for market-determined price 
RPI, which is similar to the findings in US and EU, etc. However, (2) for PPI, 
which is strongly influenced by government intervention, it is just expected 
inflation that has significant impact on RPV. Above evidence shows that fix 
cost has prevailing influence over the pricing behaviors of Chinese firms, 
especially for the state-owned enterprises with price guidance from the 
government. 
Beyond above research concerning how inflation would affect relative price 
variability, some economists following the other direction of the causality in 
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this inflation-RPV relationship, namely how the relative price would affect 
inflation in China (Chang, 1995; Chang and Hou, 1997; Yuan, 2009). This is 
because as the Chinese economy is growing fast and government intervention 
on specific sectorial prices, the realignment of relative price would accelerate 
inflation because the prices are more flexible upward. These works have 
extended our horizon in the relationship between inflation and relative price 
dispersion, but we won't talk about this tradition more in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 Inflationary Regimes and Relative Prices 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we investigate the inflation-RPV nexus in China and find that 
fix cost has strong impact on the dispersion of relative price. However, similar 
to most related research based on developed economies, our previous studies 
also do not differentiate the aggregate shocks from various inflationary 
regimes and only simply assume that pricing behaviors of firms are given by 
homogeneous inflation shocks. It is understandable for developed economies, 
such as U.S., because over the past twenty years there has been a time of 
"Great Moderation" and no significant changes of inflationary regimes have 
occurred (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Bernanke, 2004). 
However, for China, since the economic reform program In 1978 there have 
been a number of "boom-bust" macroeconomic cycles accompanied by large 
inflation movements. Hence, it is unsuitable to assume inflation shocks are 
homogenously given in one inflationary background and it is necessary to 
investigate the pricing behavior under different inflationary regimes. Over the 
past two decades, the Chinese economy has continuously experienced three 
inflationary regimes: high inflation (1991-1996), deflation (1997-2003) and 
recent moderate inflation (2003-2008). Such a diversified economic 
environment provides a best platform for the research on pricing behaviors. 
This chapter investigates the firm's price-setting behavior under different 
inflationary periods and then the relationship between inflation and relative 
price variability. Section 4.2 presents a brief review on the change of 
inflationary regimes in China over the past thirty years. Section 4.3 use two 
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datasets , market-determined pnce dataset of RPI and government control 
price dataset of PPI, to study the pricing behaviors under various inflationary 
episodes. Empirical results show that ( 1) the inflation-RPV nexus exists in 
high and moderate inflation but vanishes in deflation episode; (2) there are 
strong influences of expected inflation on RPV for both government-control 
price and market-determined price in high and moderate inflationary regimes. 
Section 4.4 focuses on the structural change and the robustness of empirical 
analysis. The breakpoints suggested by endogenous breakpoint tests are 
consistent with the ones we arbitrarily choose to divide inflationary episodes. 
4.2 The Change of Inflationary Regimes in China: 1978-2008 
Since the Reform and Open in 1978, China has experienced a series of boom-
bust inflation cycles over the past thirty years. Especially for recent two 
decades, the economy has been characterized by three different inflationary 
regimes continuously, from high inflation (1991-1996) , to deflation (1997-2003) 
and then recent moderate inflation (2003-2008). Figure 4.1 pictures above 
three inflation cycles by three price indexes, RPI , CPI and PPI respectively. 
The high inflation cycle began at the year 1991 and quickly reached the 
peak around 25% for PPI in 1993 and for RPI and CPI in 1994. Such an 
inflation boom was extinguished by harsh government macroeconomic control 
in 1993 and consequently the inflation rates declined to 15% in 1995 and then 
around 5% in 1996. There is a vast literature to explain such a "boom-burst" 
inflation feature in the Chinese economy, such as Lin et al.(2003) , Brandt and 
Zhu (2000). 
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Figure 4.1 Inflation Cycles in China 
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In the afterglow of the high inflation cycle, the Chinese economy suddenly 
came to a deflationary episode around 1997. Three price indexes were all 
towards to zero in 1997 and then became negative in 1998. Such a disinflation 
period had lasted for six years, with the lowest inflation rate around -3% 1n 
1999 for RPI and CPI and -4.1% in 1998 for PPI. Although China was In 
deflation during the period between 1997 and 2003, it still kept an annual 
growth rate above 8%. Such a puzzle of deflation with expansion IS 
investigated in Guerineau and Jeanneney (2005), Gong and Lin (2008). 
Since the year of 2003, the Chinese economy has begun a new inflation cycle. 
All of the price indexes RPI, CPI and PPI have fluctuated around 4%, at a 
much more moderate level compared to the one in previous inflationary 
regimes. At the same time, China has achieved a significant performance in 
real economy, with a significant annual growth rate of 10%. However , this 
ideal economic situation has been disturbed by external shock from global 
financial tsunami in 2008. 
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4.3 Inflationary Regimes and Relative Price 
4.3.1 Preliminary Evidence 
In China, the relative price variability is increasing in inflation as documented 
in Chapter 3. Besides, empirical evidence implies that market-determined 
prices (RPI) and government control prices (PPI) have reacted in same ways 
to inflationary shocks although the latter shows a larger fix-cost effect. The 
study on inflation-RPV nexus is further carried out in this chapter under the 
framework of three inflationary regimes: high, moderate inflation and deflation. 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2-4.3 use the monthly data from market-determined 
price dataset (RPI) and government control price dataset (PPI) in different 
inflationary episodes. The RPI sample period is from 1994:01-2008:12 while 
the period of PPI is ranged between 1996:10 and 2008:12. So the government 
control price is only analyzed in deflationary and moderate-inflationary 
regimes. 
From Table 4.1 , the positive relationship between inflation and pr1ce 
variability is more evident in terms of inflationary regimes. Similar to inflation 
uncertainty that degrades the information contents of real prices, variables of 
inflation volatility are introduced. Preliminary evidence shows that inflation 
volatility, expected inflation, unexpected inflation and relative pnce 
variability are all systematically and substantially higher at higher inflation 
and particularly in the period of high inflation. Our general results here are 
consistent with some previous findings in the research of Dabus (2000) and 
Caglayan and Filiztekin ( 2003). 
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Table 4.1 Inflation, Inflation Volatility and RPV by Inflationary Regimes 
Total P eriod High Inflation Deflation Moderate Inflation 
-:::,:' ' ·~::;: 
VOL 
-
RPI 0.55 0.90 0.40 0.54 
VOLMA 
-
RPI 0.41 0.59 0.32 0.42 
RPI El 3.05 1 ;~.52 -1.3;3 2.31 
-
RPI UI 0.11 
-
0.5;3 -0.07 0.08 
RPI CVAR 0.28 
-
0.28 0.28 0.28 
RPI UIN -0 .13 -0.07 -0 .18 -0.12 
-
R.PI UIP 0.24 0.60 0.11 0.19 
-
'PPI 1.47 N.A. -1.38. 4.38 
VOL PPI 0.56 N.A. 0.48 0.64 
-
VOLMA PPI 0.40 ~.A . 0.31 0.49 
-
PPI El 1.48 N .i\ . -1.36 4.40 
-
PPI UI 0.02 N.A. -0.02 0.06 
-
PPI CVAR. 0.36 N .i\ . o .;~6 0.37 
-
PPI UIN -0.17 N.i\ . -0.19 -0.15 
-
PPI UIP 0.19 N.A. 0.17 0.21 
-
··'.;.,,. Itl>V RPI17 0:44 1.05 0.18 }o~Y; 
-
RPV R.PIO 0.40 1.10 0.14 0.31 
-
RPV PPI38 0.59 N.i\. 0.56 0.60 
-
RPV PPIO 0.41 N.A. 0.31 0.48 
-
Note: Inflation rate is denoted by RPI and PPI. VOL and VOLMA are measures of inflation 
volatility. For instance , VOL _RP! is the difference , in absolute value , between the inflation 
rate of two successive month, i.e. VOL _ RP!= jRPI, - RP1,_1 j. VOLMA _RP! is denoted as 
the difference between the inflation rate and a centered moving average of seven 
periods( months) of inflation, i.e. VOLMA _ RP!= IRPI, -(I I 7) * L/i = 3,3)RPI,_; I· EL UI and 
CV AR are expected inflation , unexpected inflation and inflation uncertainty , respectively. 
Additionally, the increasing value of relative price variability from deflation 
period (negative inflation rate) to high inflation regimes (positive inflation 
rate) contrasts the predictions of menu cost models that RPV is increasing in 
the absolute value of expected inflation. This empirical evidence might shed 
light on the conclusion of monetary search model that the relationship 
between inflation and relative price variability is non-linear. 
Finally, comparing to market-determined price RPI , the variability and 
volatility of PPI are much larger in deflation and moderate inflation episodes. 
This is completely contrasted with previous findings that flex prices (market 
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determined prices) have much more variability and volatility, such as the 
research of Palerm (1991) for Mexico, and Dabus(2000) for Turkey. 
Figure 4.2 Market-determined Price and RPV 
.--------~----·- ---·------------·--··-------------·---·· 
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The high price dispersion in high inflation in China implies that such 
dispersion might be related with a more volatile and less predictable inflation 
rate, because the highly inflationary environment degrades the information 
contests of real price, as mentioned by Lucas (1978), Tommasi (1993) and 
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recently Miles and Vijverberg (2009). 
In this section we investigate the association between relative price variability 
and inflation and its volatility, and then we study RPV as a function of 
expected inflation, unexpected inflation and inflation uncertainty, in a similar 
way as In our previous chapters. The difference is that above empirical 
analysis IS conducted separately in the framework of three different 
inflationary regimes: high inflation, deflation and moderate inflation. We 
employ two well-constructed monthly datasets, market-determined price 
dataset of RPI and government control price dataset of PPI. 
Table 4.2 reports the regression results for relative price variability against 
inflation and its volatility . First , the positive association between price 
variability and inflation is verified in the total period as well as regimes of 
moderate and high inflation. However , in deflationary episode, the inflation-
RPV nexus is ambiguous and uncertain. For example, the relationship is not 
significant for PPI-38 while such association is held again if the supply shocks 
are controlled. For market-determined price RPI , the relationship between 
inflation and relative price variability is significantly negative, similar with 
Reinsforf (1994) for U.S., Silver and Ioannidis (2001) for some European 
countries. But if we control the supply shocks, such a negative relationship 
becomes insignificant. Second , the inflation volatilities of both two types of 
prices have no significant influence over relative price variability in most cases, 
except the one of government control price in disinflationary period. From 
above findings , the relationship between inflation and relative price variability 
is verified in most cases as previous study, but the price behaviors in 
deflationary regimes needs further studies , both theoretically and empirically. 
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Regressions for relative price variability against expected, unexpected inflation 
and its uncertainty are reported in Table 4.3. The results shows that expected 
inflation has impact on relative price in most cases, for both two types of 
prices, which implies that fix cost still plays an crucial role in price behavior 
in the Chinese economy. However, the effect of menu cost is larger in 
moderate inflation regime than in two others. Taking RPI as an example, the 
estimates of the coefficients on expected inflation (El) is 0.011, which is much 
larger than 0.0021 in high inflation and -0.009 in deflationary period. It 
suggests that more price stickiness in moderate inflation for Chinese firms and 
the role of expected inflation may change in different inflationary regimes. 
Further more, unexpected inflation has significant influence on the RPV for 
both prices by controlling supply shock in the episodes of high inflation and 
moderate inflation, but this effect is not clear in deflationary regime. It 
implies that goods sellers are sensitive to positive aggregate shock. Due to 
unequal price elasticities of supply across firms, their discrepancy in price 
adjustment across sectors will increase with the magnitude of the aggregate 
demand shock (Hercowitz , 1981). 
Finally, it is worthy to shedding light on the price mechanisms in deflationary 
regimes. For RPI, expected inflation has negative influence on RPV during 
deflationary time, which implies that most retail firms might be unwilling to 
reduce their goods price as the inflation rate decreases. Reindorf (1994) has 
the similar findings in the period of V olcker disinflation from 1980 to 1982 in 
U .S. In contrast , the effect of expected inflation on RPV is positive for 
government control pnce PPI 1n deflationary episode. One possible 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4 Structure Change 
4.4.1 Endogenous Breakpoint Test 
In this section, we test whether there arc structural changes in the regressions 
presented in the previous section. Our research mainly focuses on the changing 
role of expected inflation that is dominant for the inflation-RPV nexus. Differing 
with Chow test employed by Dabus (2000), we apply the endogenous breakpoint 
test proposed by Andrews (1993) and Andrew and Plobergcr (1994) which IS 
designed to detect a structural break even if the breakpoint is unknown. It IS 
possible for such an endogenous to capture the changing role of expected inflation 
under different scenarios and shed more light on the switching mechanism of 
inflation regimes in the Chinese economy. 
The endogenous breakpoint tests are implemented as follows. Having defined a 
sequence of dummy variables D(j) that equal 0 if t < j and 1 otherwise, we 
estimate for each j a break-augmented RPV equation that allows a shift in the 
marginal impact of expected inflation at date j. The reason we only conduct 
break test for expected inflation because most of its estimated coefficients are 
significant. For the four variance-based RPV measures we obtain the following 
test equations: 
In a first step, we derive for each j E [T1, T2 ] the Likelihood ratio statistics ( LR(j)) 
corresponding to the null hypothesis that 51 , the coefficient of the dummy 
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variable, is zero. In a second step, we compute the test statistics average LR and 
maximum LR for unknown breakpoint of all LR(j) statistics, respectively. The 
date j which corresponds to maximum LR serves as the estimate of the 
breakpoint date. 
Andrews (1993) showed that the asymptotic distributions of the test-statistics are 
non-standard and depend on the number of coefficients that arc allowed to break 
and on the fraction of the sample that is examined. In the following, we use the 
approximate asymptotic p-values provided by Hansen (1997). 
4.4.2 Test Results on the Changing Role of Expected Inflation 
Table 4.4 summarizes the test results obtained for measures of inflation and RPV. 
The LR-statistics shows that there exist structural breaks in the impact of 
expected inflation over RPV. Andrews' test could provide just an endogenous 
breakpoint in one test, so we conduct two-step excise for RPI. During the overall 
period from 1994M01 to 2008M12 , the break date implied by the maximum LR 
statistics is both June 1996 for RPV rpi17 and RPV rpiO. Then another test 
from 1997M01 to 2008M12 is conducted and the break dates are shown as 
2003Mll and 2003M10 for RPV _ rpi17 and RPV _ rpiO , respectively. 
However , for PPI-38, according to the maximum LR statistics, the break occurs 
in 1999M10, about 36 months before the breakpoint 2003M01 that we arbitrarily 
choose. Such a deviation may result from the supply shock for PPI during 
China's deflationary regimes . So we control the supply shock and make an 
alternative test for core PPI, which implies a more satisfactory break date in 
2004M09. 
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Table 4.4 Test for Unknown Breakpoint in the Inflation-RPV nexus of China 
HO: No Breaks in the role of expected inflation for RPV 
Model Statistic Value Pro b. 
From 1994:01 to 2008:12 
RPVRPI 17 A ve LR F -statistic 39.34 0.00 
Maxim urn LR F -statistic (1996M06) 75.51 0.00 
RPV RPI -cnre A ve LR F -statistic 21.80 0.00 
Maximum LR F -statistic (1996M06) 66.76 0.00 
From 1997:01 to 2008:12 
RPVR/'1 -17 A ve LR F -statistic 29.73 0.00 
Maximum LR F-statistic (2003M11) 54.01 0.00 
RPVHI'I-cnn' A ve LR F -statistic 19.01 0.00 
Maximum LR F-statistic (2003M10) 38.08 0.00 
RPVPPI -.1R A ve LR F -statistic 2.38 0.08 
Maxim urn LR F -statistic (1999M10) 11.20 0.02 
RPVPPI -cnre A ve LR F -statistic 3.78 0.02 
Maximum LR F-statistic (2004M09) 11.56 0.01 
As we showed in Section 4. 2, the inflationary regimes change from high inflation 
to deflation around January 1997, and from disinflation to moderate inflation 
around January 2003. The breakpoint in June 1996 for the first switch is a little 
earlier than our arbitrary given data, but the points around November 2003 for 
RPI and September 2004 for PPI are much later than our observed date for the 
second regime change. One possible explanation is retail firms were able to 
anticipate deflation more accurately than moderate inflation. So the endogenous 
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break date is quite consistent with the observed date. However, for firm in 
deflation (more pessimistic), it is hard to anticipate the positive aggregate shock 
in the future and hence the role of expected inflation change much later, 
especially for fix price PPI. 
We revisit the inflation-RPV equation for all RPV measures taking into account 
the insights of the endogenous breakpoint tests but find no fundamental change 
of the estimated coefficients of expected, unexpected inflation and inflation 
uncertainty in different episodes, comparing to the estimating results in our three 
inflationary regimes in Section 4.3. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The relationship between inflation and relative price variability is investigated 
here under different inflationary regimes. The empirical results show that ( 1) the 
inflation-RPV nexus is significant in high and moderate inflation but vanishes in 
deflation episode; (2) there are significant influences of expected inflation on RPV 
for both government-control price and market-determined price in high and 
moderate inflationary regimes; (3) it is vague and unclear for the pricing behavior 
in the period of disinflation. More theoretical and empirical efforts arc required to 
further the understanding of economics of deflation. The structural change 
analysis in the last section shows that breakpoints suggested by endogenous 
breakpoint tests arc consistent with the ones we used to divide inflationary 
episodes, which means the empirical results arc reliable and robust. 
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Chapter 5 Institutional Cost and Relative Price 
Variability 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters imply that China's relative pncc variability is mainly 
determined by expected inflation. It seems that menu cost models play a 
dominant role in the process of price setting in the Chinese economy. However, it 
is still hard to explain why China has much more relative price variability than 
other large economics. Figure 5.1 depicts the monthly relative price variability of 
three representative economics , China, United State and India. Over the past ten 
years, the maximum RPV in China is 1.93%, while the counterpart in US is 
1.46% and India is 0.82%. Further statistics shows that, China has an average 
RPV of 0.39% over the past ten year, which is 1.35 times, 3.82 times, 5.39 t imes 
and 5.27 times larger than the ones in United States, Europe, Japan and India, 
respectively. Beyond the common "menu cost" considered in firm's pricing 
behavior, there must be some unique factors that result into the over variability 
of relative price in the Chinese economy. 
One explanation to the phenomenon of over relative pncc variability is that 
China has much more "menu cost" than other countries. However, it seems 
unacceptable to argue that Chinese firms need to pay more on printing new price 
lists, informing salesmen of new prices , etc. In reality, there is little difference for 
the menu cost of firms among various regions. Golosov and Lucas (2007) 's recent 
study shows that the size of the menu cost needed to match the micro-data of 
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pnce adjustment inside a standard business cycle model is implausibly large to 
justify the menu-cost argument, which implies that menu cost is just a small part 
of factors to explain economic fluctuation. Hence, rather than menu cost, there 
might exist other important underlying factors determining the pricing behavior 
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Figure 5.1 RPV in large economies . Source : CEIC. In order to control supply 
shock, relative price variability is measured by eliminating subcomponents related 
to energy and agricultural goods2. 
This chapter is concerned with investigating the "institutional cost" which is 
uniquely incorporated in the price-setting behavior of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and then its effect on the relative price variability. This study argues 
that there exist significant "institutional costs" to Chinese firms in adjusting 
2 US : PPI with 15 subcomponents, eliminating "Fuels, Fuels Products & Power (Fuels)", " Farm Products", "Processed 
Foods and Feeds"; China: PPI with 38 subcomponents, eliminating " Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction", 
"Agricultural & Sideline Food Processing", "Food Manufacturing", "Coking & Nuclear Fuel & Petroleum Processing" , 
and "Gas Production & Supply"; India : Wholesale Price Index with 3 subcomponents, by eliminating " Fuel, Power, 
Light & Lubricants" 
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pnces, and by incorporating the "institutional cost" into the theories developed 
by Rotemberg (1983), Danziger(1987), a framework is developed to explain why 
China has much more relative price variability than other large economies. 
5.2 Institutional Cost, Price Adjustment, and Relative Price Variability in China 
5.2.1 Background 
In the transitional China, the economic system has two essential features that 
differentiate it from its market-driven counterparts, such as US, EU, etc. First, 
there is a hierarchical system of government intervention and its institutional 
structure in the economy. Second, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a micro 
foundation role in the macroeconomic operation process. 
Consider the system of government intervention first. Although China has 
experienced a thirty-year tour of economic reform and market mechanism has 
played an important role in the economy, however, the government still intervene 
the market operation strongly. From the perspective of institutional structure, 
there is the hierarchical system of National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) from the level of central government to the local county. 
This system is mainly responsible for government intervention in the economy. In 
China, government intervention is called "macroeconomic control", which refers 
to the use of direct intervention by the government to cool down the overheated 
economy. The policies of macro control include price control of specific sectors, 
collective measures to constrain monetary policy, lower supplies of raw materials 
and reduce domestic consumption. The purpose was to make the economy more 
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stable in a "boom-bust" cycle. 
On the micro side of the economy, the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
play a central role for the realization of macroeconomic control purpose. The first 
reason is that SOEs have accounted for major part of gross domestic product 
over the past years3 . Secondly, SOEs arc the largest credit demander from the 
state banking system. As pointed out by Gong and Lin (2008), cheap and 
sufficient financial resources are the key source of high growth in investment and 
then economic boom. However, such large credit supply may result in huge bad 
loans, which will threat to the stability of China's financial system. As a 
consequence, every time there is heat signal in the economy, such as increasing 
inflation rate , SOEs will always act as one of the most important policy tools of 
the macroeconomic control. The credit supply quota for SOEs will be reduced 
and prices of firm 's specific products will be controlled. 
The linkage between government intervention and the activities of state-owned 
enterprise is one of the most important characteristics in the Chinese economy. 
Basing on this linkage, Brandt and Zhu (2000) explained the "boom-bust" 
business cycles over the past years. 
5.2.2 Institutional cost 
Under the transitional background , the pnc1ng bchavior of the Chinese firms, 
especially for SOEs, is highly different from their counterparts in developed 
economics. Since the reform of state-owned enterprises in 1990s, operation 
3 The percentage of SOEs' product in GDP is 48% in the year of 2007 and is much higher in the former years . 
39 
performance has been set as the main goal of the SOEs by the government. And 
for the CEOs in these enterprises, profit is the foundation of their payment and 
political promotion. In general time, SOEs could set prices freely and max1m1ze 
their profits, which is similar to the behaviors of private firms. 
However, 1n the episode of economic boom, everything 1s changed. 
Macroeconomic control over the whole economy IS started and the pnces of 
SOEs' products are highly supervised and even controlled by the government. In 
such a special period, the best choice of SOEs is to increase product price in 
order to keep operation performance, while this pricing bchavior contrasts with 
the government's goal of price stabilization and further destructs the political 
fame of CEOs. Leaders of SOEs always need to balance during this harsh time . 
For instance, in the period with increasing inflation from 2007 to 2008, JIANG 
Jieming, the Chairman of PetroChina Company, once expressed his opinion on 
the price-setting system of oil SOEs as following: 
It should be very scnsjtJ've wjth regard to the pn'cjng jssue of refined oil. 
Recently the Jnternatjonal ojl pn'ce has broken through 100 US$/bbl and 
remained hjgh after that, wh1ie the domestjc refined oil IS stJ'll kept at 68-70 
US$/bbl, whjch results jn a contradjctjon between Internal and external 
markets. Operating performance IS very Important for our company. However, 
as a state-owned enterprjse, we also need to take some socjal responsjbJ}jty ... In 
accordance wjth the reform djrectJ'on of market-determjned prjce system, 
PetroChjna has request the government to re-adjust the o1i pn'ce. 
---Jjang Jjemjn, Chairman of PetroCh1na Company Ljmjtcd, March 20, 2008 
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Hence, one possible choice for the SOEs' leader is to persuade the price authority, 
namely NDRC, into agreeing price re-adjust application. So the firms' operation 
performance is kept while CEOs' political fame is not affected seriously. 
The Chinese firm's lobbying behavior is pervasive and significant and a large 
amount of expenditure is spent on this activities. We define "institutional cost" 
as the expenditure on lobbying government for price-resetting agreement. 
Obviously this . type of cost is rarely found 1n developed economies. For 
institutional cost , one important property is that it highly depends on inflation 
rate. As inflation rises , macro control of the Chinese government starts, specific 
prices of SOEs ' products arc controlled and the lobbying activities is then 
pervasive, which results in increase of institutional cost. In contrast, the cost will 
decrease as the inflation falls down. 
The best measurement of institutional cost is firm's entertainment costs with 
government. Cai et al (2005) 's study on the corruption activities in China implies 
that entertainment and travel costs (ETC) is a standard expenditure item for 
Chinese firms with an annual amount equal to about 3 percent of total value 
added. Generally, ETC is a part of management fees. Due to the scarcity of time 
series data of ETC, management fee is used as a proxy of institutional cost. 
Figure 5.2 depict the growth trend of inflation rate (CPI) and institutional cost 
from February 2002 to December 2006. The coexistence relationship is significant 
for these two serious. 
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Figure 5.2 Inflation and Institutional Cost 
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The relative price variability will be positively influenced by institutional costs in 
the Chinese econorny. Assume the SOEs follow an (S, s) pricing scheme to set 
prices discontinuously. If inflation comes, then the firm's real price starts at S 
and then falls to s over time. At that time, the firm increases its nominal price to 
keep its real price once again equal S. On the other side with deflation trend, a 
firm decreases its nominal price accordingly. 
Beyond the menu cost, the existence of SOEs' institutional costs have extra 
impact over the width of (S, s) band. It has increased the cost of pnce 
adjustment and will lead to larger width of (S , s). For a given aggregate inflation 
shock, increasing firm-specific institutional cost lead to staggered price setting, 
distorted relative price, and an increase of relative price variability. Therefore, 
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institutional cost models typically imply that relative price variability (RPV) 1s 
increasing with the value of institutional cost. 
5.3 The Empirical Evidence 
The empirical property of relative pnce variability (RPV) will be briefly 
examined in this section by using monthly data from January 2003 to December 
2006 in China collected by the National Bureau Statistics (NBS). Three related 
variables are introduced as follows. 
Our hypothesis of institutional cost mainly bases on the pricing behavior of state-
owned en tcrpriscs whose product prices arc highly guided and even con trolled by 
the government. In China, most large industrial enterprises are state-owned. So 
the best measurement of inflation rate is Producer Price of Industrial Good (PPI). 
PPI is constituted by the product-level prices of industrial goods that are 
collected by the NBS every month. Then the variable of relative price variability 
(RPV) is measured by the prices of 38 subcomponents of PPI by control supply 
shock. 
As mentioned before, the ideal measure of institutional cost is the amount of 
expenditure on lobbying government , namely the entertainment expenditure with 
government officers. However, there is no clear accounting category on such kind 
of expenditure. In this thesis , we use management fees that include business 
entertainment expenditure as a proxy of institutional cost for Chinese industrial 
enterprises. IC is measured as the year on year growth rate for monthly 
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management fees from January 2003 to December 2006. 
Table 5.1 Average Monthly Data of RPV, PPI and IC (%) 
RPV PPI IC 
2nn~o1 n.2~ ~ - ()~ 1s.n2 
2003Q2 0.16 2.30 15.03 
2003Q3 0.16 1.40 15.07 
2003Q4 0.40 2.03 21.56 
2004Q1 0.72 3.63 19.92 
2004Q2 1.33 5.70 21.12 
2004Q3 0.96 7.03 18.55 
2004Q4 0.83 7.87 16.22 
2005Q1 0.42 5.60 19.17 
2005Q2 0.43 5.63 20.65 
2005Q3 0.33 5.00 21.04 
2005Q4 0.25 3.47 20.96 
2006Q1 0.21 2.85 16.28 
2006Q2 0.37 2.61 17.37 
2006Q3 0.47 3.48 16.93 
2006Q4 0.40 2.91 14.33 
Source: CEIC, China Data Online. Quarterly growth rate is calculated by 
the average of three monthly data. 
The theory predicts that the amplitude of relative pnce variability in China 
increases with institutional cost, and for the specific function forms, that RPV is 
a linear function of institutional cost (IC). Regressing RPV on IC yields the 
following estimates: 
RPV = - 0.028+ 0.027 /C, 
(- 0.16) (2 .75 ) 
R 2 = 12.5°/o , D.W. = 0.49 
t -statistics are shown 1n parentheses. The coefficient of IC 1s positive and 
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statistically very significant. R square is equal to 12.5%. Accordingly, it is clear 
that relative price variability highly correlated with institutional cost and it 
clearly shows that institutional cost highly influence the relative price dispersion 
in the transitional Chinese economy. 
5.4 Conclusion 
China has exhibited much more relative pnce variability than other large 
economies. Beyond the fix cost (namely, menu cost), we find that there exists 
"institutional cost" uniquely incorporated in transitional China. Institutional cost 
is defined as the financial expenditure of SOEs on lobbying the government for 
price-resetting agreement. The theoretical framework we developed suggests that 
the relative price variability of China is influenced by the amount of institutional 
cost which doesn't exist in market-based economy. In the empirical part, we find 
that institutional cost could explain about 12.5 percent of relative pnce 
variability in China. Above theoretical and empirically conclusions have 
important implications for macroeconomic policy in China, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Implications 
This thesis investigates the relationship between inflation and relative pnce 
variability (RPV) in the transitional Chinese economy. Different from the 
empirical research on market economies, we construct a comparative group with 
two price datascts in order to capture the transitional characteristics in China: 
one is retail price with market-determined characteristics and the other is 
producer price with government-controlled features. The sample period is from 
October 1994 to December 2008. 
The main empirical findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 include: (1) inflation 
and relative price variability is highly correlated for two types of prices, market-
determined price RPI and government control price PPI, in the overall sample 
periods; (2) expected inflation has significant influence over RPV, which implies 
that fix cost plays a central role in pricing behavior of the Chinese firms. Further 
evidence suggests that the effects of fix cost on RPV is larger for government 
control prices than for market-determined prices; (3) the study on inflation-RPV 
nexus under different inflationary regimes shows that the relationship between 
inflation and RPV is robust both in high and moderate inflationary episodes but 
vague and unclear under the period of deflation. 
Additionally, in order to explain why China has much more relative pnce 
variability than other large economies, a theoretical price-setting model of state-
owned enterprises is developed in Chapter 5 and implies that the relative price 
variability in China is highly determined by the amount of institutional cost 
46 
which doesn't exist in market-based economy. Empirical evidence shows that 
institutional cost and RPV is significantly correlated and the former could 
explain about 12.5 percent of RPV in China. 
Above theoretical and empirical findings have important implications for the 
future macroeconornic policies in China. 
First, the real effect of inflation through inflation-RPV nexus is significant in the 
Chinese economy in short term. Hence, rather than to focus on the policy goal of 
economic growth, monetary authority in China should mainly emphasize on 
inflation control and price stabilization, which will contribute to improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation in the whole real economy. 
Second, it is necessary to further the market-driven reform to reduce institutional 
cost that has resulted in large relative price dispersion. Fundamentally, price 
control is the main reason of institutional cost in China. Hence, the government 
should gradually reduce the price control in specific sectors and set up a much 
more equal and competitive environment for firms in the economy (Hope et al, 
2003). 
Finally, short-term macroeconomic policies should pay more attention to the 
micro-foundations of the Chinese economy. Take institutional cost as an example, 
monetary policy should consider the mechanism between institutional cost and 
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